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HURD V. ESPINOZA: “THIRD-PARTY CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMATION” IN DELAWARE CORPORATE LITIGATION 
Hurd v. Espinoza, 34 A.3d 1084 (Del. 2011) 
Giselle Gutierrez

 
 On June 24, 2010, celebrity attorney Gloria Allred sent a letter (the 
Allred Letter)
1
 to Mark Hurd, then the Chief Executive Officer of Hewlett-
Packard Company (HP), claiming that Hurd sexually harassed her client 
Jodie Fisher, a former HP contractor.
2
 In addition to being marked 
“CONFIDENTIAL TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY,” the letter 
included a ledger at the top that read, “PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL.”3 
Hurd gave the letter to Michael Holston, HP’s Executive Vice President 
and General Counsel.
4
 Although Hurd and Fisher privately settled the 
claim without Fisher filing suit, HP publicly announced on August 6, 2010, 
that Hurd had resigned from HP.
5
  
                                                                                                                     
 J.D. 2012, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A. 2009, Florida International 
University. I would like to thank Professor Tom C.W. Lin for inspiring me to write this Comment 
and for his guidance throughout this process. I would also like to thank my family for their 
unwavering support, including my mother and grandmother. Me han enseñado lo mas importante en 
la vida: nunca pierdas la fe. Finally, thank you to Paul Pakidis and Lauren Millcarek for their 
helpful comments and to the wonderful colleagues I have had the pleasure of working with on the 
Florida Law Review. 
 1. Quentin Hardy, Letter that Led to Downfall of Hewlett Chief Surfaces, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/business/note-that-led-to-downfall-of-hewlett-
chief-surfaces.html. 
 2. See Espinoza v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 6000-VCP, 2011 WL 941464, at *1–2 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 17, 2011). The letter contained extremely personal and sensitive information about Hurd 
and Fisher: 
As you were walking back to the Ritz, you invited Ms. Fisher to come up to your 
room. . . . She did not want to go. Ms. Fisher first went to her room and called her 
sponsor in AA, Diane Rogers. Ms. Fisher reported to her what the situation was 
and asked for her advice. She agreed that Ms. Fisher “had” to go but that Ms. 
Fisher should remember who she was and that she did not ever have to do 
anything that compromised her integrity. . . . Ms. Fisher went to your suite. . . . 
She sat down on one of two love seats in the sitting room. She was worried when 
you came over and sat directly next to her and put your arm on the back of the 
love seat. As you did so, your hand brushed across her breast. . . . It happened a 
second time . . . . 
Letter from Gloria Allred, Partner, Allred, Maroko & Goldberg, to Mark Hurd, Chief Exec. Officer, 
Hewlett-Packard Co. 3 (June 24, 2010) [hereinafter Allred Letter], available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/hurd_letter.pdf. 
 3. Espinoza, 2011 WL 941464, at *1–2; Allred Letter, supra note 2, at 1. 
 4. Espinoza, 2011 WL 941464, at *2. 
 5. Id.; see also Colin Barr, HP Chief Hurd Quits After Sexual Harassment Claim, CNN 
MONEY (Aug. 6, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2010/08/06/news/companies/hurd.resignation.fortune/ 
(“Hewlett-Packard chief executive officer Mark Hurd, one of the highest-profile CEOs in America, 
1
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Eleven days later, Ernesto Espinoza, an HP shareholder, sent a demand 
letter to HP requesting to inspect HP’s documents in order to investigate 
“corporate mismanagement, wrongdoing, and waste.”6 Among the 
requested documents was the Allred Letter.
7
 Despite many requests from 
both Hurd and Fisher that HP keep the Allred Letter confidential,
8
 HP 
decided to disclose the letter to Espinoza.
9
 Hurd and Fisher failed to settle 
the dispute with Espinoza out of court or convince Espinoza and HP to 
keep the Allred Letter confidential.
10
  
On November 17, 2010, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a 
sealing order instructing the parties to file the pleadings under seal so that 
Hurd could motion the court if he wanted the pleadings to remain sealed.
11
 
The next day, Espinoza filed suit to inspect certain HP books and records 
for the purpose of “investigati[ng] . . . whether Board members breached 
their duty to HP.”12 Attached to the complaint was the Allred Letter, which 
was filed under seal.
13
 HP then filed its answer under seal.
14
 Hurd moved 
to have certain pieces of the complaint and answer remain sealed.
15
 He 
formally intervened in the action on December 28, 2010.
16
 On January 21, 
2011, the court held a hearing on Hurd’s motions.17 The court asked HP to 
file an amended answer but reserved judgment on the motion to have the 
complaint remain sealed.
18
 On March 17, 2011, the court issued an order 
stating that the Allred Letter must be unsealed.
19
  
                                                                                                                     
resigned Friday following a sexual harassment claim against him and the company.”).  
 6. Espinoza, 2011 WL 941464, at *2 (quoting Affidavit of Keith Paul Bishop) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at *2–3 (“The following day, Hurd’s counsel sent a letter to HP requesting that it 
oppose the ‘inspection, disclosure and/or copying’ of the Allred Letter or related documents in 
response to Plaintiff’s Demand Letter.”). Further, Allred wrote another letter to HP requesting to 
keep the Allred Letter private. Id. at *2 (“Allred sent a letter to Holston, as Executive Vice 
President and General Counsel of HP, and Amy Wintersheimer Findley, an attorney for 
Hurd . . . [in which Ms. Allred] emphasized the confidential nature of the Allred Letter . . . .”). 
 9. Id. at *3. HP described the letter as “nonconfidential.” Id.  
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. at *4. 
 12. Id. at *4; Complaint for Relief Pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 220, ¶ 1, Espinoza v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., 2011 WL 941464 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 2011) (No. 6000-VCP). 
 13. Espinoza, 2011 WL 941464, at *3–4. 
 14. Id. at *4. 
 15. Id. at *4; see also Del. Ch. Ct. R. 5(g)(3) (“[T]he Court may, in its discretion, by 
appropriate order, authorize the parties or other persons to designate documents to be filed under 
seal pending a judicial determination of the specific documents or categories of documents to which 
such restriction on public access shall continue to apply.”). 
 16. Espinoza, 2011 WL 941464, at *4. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at *1. The Delaware Court of Chancery came to this conclusion not only through the 
analysis of Delaware Court Rules but also by analyzing California law. See Hurd v. Espinoza, 34 
2
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/8
2012] “THIRD-PARTY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION” IN DELAWARE CORPORATE LITIGATION 1115 
 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Delaware, Hurd argued that 
unsealing the Allred Letter, which was attached to the complaint, would 
violate California privacy rights.
20
 The Supreme Court of Delaware 
explained that the issue––whether the court should unseal a document filed 
in the Court of Chancery––does not implicate California privacy rights, but 
it is instead governed by Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 5(g),
21
 which 
concerns the sealing of court records.
22
 The court held that under 
Rule 5(g), as interpreted by Delaware courts, Hurd’s argument did not 
constitute “good cause” to keep the Allred Letter sealed.23 Later that same 
day, the New York Times disseminated the letter to the world.
24
 
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court of Delaware decided 
Hurd incorrectly. First, this Comment reviews information essential to 
understanding the Hurd ruling, specifically Rule 5(g) and cases interpreting 
that rule. Second, this Comment explains how the decision in Hurd fits 
into the law. Third, this Comment explains why the Supreme Court of 
Delaware, by failing to find good cause to keep the Allred Letter sealed, 
decided Hurd incorrectly and uses a hypothetical involving Steve Jobs to 
illustrate the ramifications of the court’s decision.  
 The court’s analysis turns on its understanding of Rule 5(g), 
Delaware’s rule on the sealing of court records. First, it is necessary to 
review the Rule and how it has been interpreted. Rule 5(g)(1) states that 
“all pleadings and other papers, including deposition transcripts and 
exhibits, answers to interrogatories and requests for admissions, and 
affidavits or certificates and exhibits thereto (‘documents’) filed with the 
Register in Chancery shall become a part of the public record of the 
proceedings before [the Court of Chancery].”25 Rule 5(g)(2) expands on 
this (while permitting a good cause exception to keep documents private) 
by stating, “Documents shall not be filed under seal unless and except to 
the extent that the person seeking such filing under seal shall have first 
obtained, for good cause shown, an order of this Court specifying those 
documents or categories of documents which should be filed under 
seal . . . .”26 Just because a sealing order is granted, though, does not mean 
that the documents it protects will remain private forever. Rule 5(g) goes 
on to state that unless the duration of the sealing order is extended (again 
                                                                                                                     
A.3d 1084, 1086 (Del. 2011) (“The trial court analyzed Hurd’s California law claims at length and 
concluded that he failed to demonstrate that disclosure of the Allred letter would invade any 
California privacy rights codified in the state Constitution, its statutes, or common law.”). 
 20. Hurd, 34 A.3d at 1086. 
 21. Id. at 1085–86. Essentially, the Supreme Court of Delaware believes that other states’ 
privacy rights are irrelevant when deciding whether pleadings in Delaware courts should be sealed. 
 22. Del. Ch. Ct. R. 5(g). 
 23. Hurd, 34 A.3d at 1086. 
 24. See Hardy, supra note 1. 
 25. Del. Ch. Ct. R. 5(g)(1). 
 26. Id. 5(g)(2) (emphasis added). 
3
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requiring a showing of good cause), sealing orders expire “three years after 
the final disposition of the action.”27 At that time, any documents 
previously protected by the seal become part of the public record.
28
 Thus, 
whether a document may be filed under seal and remain sealed hinges on 
the presence of good cause. Unfortunately, Rule 5(g) fails to set out a clear 
standard for what constitutes good cause; however, case law exists that has 
interpreted the good cause standard.   
The Delaware Court of Chancery has found good cause for sealing a 
document in instances where the petitioner demonstrated that the document 
contained trade secrets, nonpublic financial information, or third-party 
confidential information.
29
 In general, Delaware courts balance “the 
general principle that items filed in . . . [c]ourt become a part of the public 
record with the need to protect the sensitive information of parties’ to 
litigation.”30 Essentially, the court weighs public access to information 
with the parties’ (or third parties’) privacy. 
Delaware courts have elaborated on the burden of showing that good 
cause exists because certain documents contain confidential information.
31
 
For instance, in Stone v. Ritter,
32
 the defendants petitioned the Court of 
Chancery to maintain certain parts of the complaint under seal.
33
 The 
defendants argued that the court should seal the portions of the complaint 
that included information regarding a due diligence assessment and board 
meeting minutes because those portions included confidential 
information.
34
 The court held that nothing in the complaint was 
confidential in nature and that the complaint should be unsealed.
35
 
Regarding the due diligence assessment, the court found that it was not 
                                                                                                                     
 27. Id. 5(g)(8). Rule 5(g)(8) states that “any order permitting or requiring a document, brief or 
letter to be filed or remain filed under seal . . . shall expire three years after the final disposition of 
the action . . . .” Id. 
 28. Id. Rule 5(g)(8) states that “any document, brief or letter filed under seal pursuant to the 
Sealing Order shall become a part of the public record. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in 
this Rule 5(g)(8), the time within which the Sealing Order shall expire may be extended by the 
Court for good cause shown.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 29. Romero v. Dowdell, No. Civ.A. 1398-N, 2006 WL 1229090, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 
2006) (“This Court repeatedly has held that good cause exists pursuant to Rule 5(g) to seal 
documents containing (1) trade secrets, (2) third-party confidential material or (3) nonpublic 
financial information.” (citing One Sky, Inc. v. Katz, No. Civ.A. 1030-N, 2005 WL 1300767, at *1 
(Del. Ch. May 12, 2005) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Cantor, No. 16297-NC, 2001 WL 422633, at *2 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 2001)); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. 15452-NC, 2004 WL 
368938, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2004))). 
 30. Fitzgerald, 2001 WL 422633, at *2. 
 31. Romero, 2006 WL 1229090, at *1; Stone v. Ritter, No. Civ.A. 1570-N, 2005 WL 
2416365, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 26, 2005). 
 32. Stone, 2005 WL 2416365, at *1. 
 33. Id. at *1.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at *2–3.  
4
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confidential because it was “historical in nature.”36 The court then reasoned 
that the board meeting minutes were not confidential because disclosing 
the minutes would not “chill the board or committee’s deliberative 
processes.”37 The court did not give examples of what would be considered 
“confidential” to justify a showing of good cause. However, the court 
stated that Rule 5(g) requires “balancing the interests of companies in 
protecting proprietary commercial, trade secret or other confidential 
information against the legitimate interests of the public in litigation filed 
in the courts, as well as stockholder interests in monitoring how directors 
of Delaware corporations perform their managerial duties.”38 
In Romero v. Dowdell,
39
 defendant Career Education Corporation 
(CEC) provided the plaintiff with several “confidential” and “highly 
confidential” documents pursuant to section 220 of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law.
40
 The plaintiff, through a derivative action, filed a 
complaint and included information from the confidential documents that 
CEC had provided, specifically the CEC Audit Committee meeting 
minutes.
41
 CEC requested that the Court of Chancery seal portions of the 
complaint, arguing that good cause existed because the complaint 
contained “third-party confidential information.”42 CEC explained that the 
minutes discussed in the complaint contained information about an 
employee that the employee could reasonably have expected to be kept 
confidential.
43
 The court held that CEC failed to meet its burden to show 
that good cause existed to keep the documents under seal.
44
 The court 
reasoned that “[t]he employee is not named in the minutes and no further 
information is provided about the employee’s concerns.”45 Further, the 
court stated that there was “no showing that the minutes provide 
information that could lead one to identify the employee.”46 Like in Stone, 
the court did not explain what would be considered sufficiently 
confidential to constitute a showing of good cause. The court merely 
refuted the defendant’s arguments. 
In sum, both Rule 5(g) and case law explain that to seal a document 
filed with the court, a party must show good cause. Case law exists to 
explain what constitutes a trade secret or nonpublic financial information. 
However, neither Rule 5(g) nor case law explains what is sufficiently 
                                                                                                                     
 36. Id. at *2. 
 37. Id. at *2–3.  
 38. Id. at *2. 
 39.  No. Civ.A. 1398-N, 2006 WL 1229090, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2006). 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at *4. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
5
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confidential to constitute a showing of good cause. In the cases described 
above, the defendants made several arguments that the information in the 
pleadings was confidential; in both cases, the defendants were 
unsuccessful.  
Second, it is important to understand how Hurd fits into the Rule 5(g) 
framework. In the instant case, the court reviewed the lower court’s 
decision using the abuse of discretion standard.
47
 Hurd did not argue that 
the Allred Letter contained trade secrets or nonpublic financial 
information; rather, he argued that the information contained confidential 
information. Hurd contended that the Allred Letter should remain sealed 
because unsealing the letter would violate his privacy rights under 
California law.
48
 The court declined to decide the issue on the basis of 
California law,
49
 explaining instead that the issue was governed by 
Rule 5(g).
50
 After stating that the Allred Letter did not contain information 
regarding trade secrets or nonpublic financial information, the court 
explained why the Allred Letter also did not contain third-party 
confidential information.
51
 
The court gave several reasons why the Allred Letter did not contain 
third-party confidential information. First, the court stated that despite 
Hurd’s argument that the letter was marked “personal and confidential” 
when sent to Hurd in his official capacity as CEO of HP, the substance of 
the letter—rather than its labeling—was crucial in deciding whether the 
letter contained third-party confidential information.
52
 Next, the court 
pointed out that the letter stated that Fisher’s potential claims were against 
not only Hurd, but also HP.
53
 Third, the court stated that “virtually every 
media” outlet had reported the content of the Allred Letter.54 And finally, 
the court noted that the letter “[did] not describe any intimate 
conversations or conduct.”55 The court therefore held that Hurd failed to 
establish good cause to keep the Allred Letter sealed.
56
 Without any 
obvious benefit to the either Espinoza or HP with regard to their litigation 
before the court, the private matters of Hurd and Fisher were made part of 
the public record and disclosed to the world. 
Third, the Supreme Court of Delaware decided Hurd incorrectly for 
three reasons: first, the court’s reasoning had little basis in existing law; 
second, the court offered unpersuasive and illogical grounds in an attempt 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Hurd v. Espinoza, 34 A.3d 1084, 1086 (Del. 2011). 
 48. Id. at 1085. 
 49. Id. at 1086. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
6
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to justify its decision that the letter was nonconfidential; and third, the 
court’s decision creates dangerous policy implications that permit 
shareholders and plaintiffs’ attorneys to maliciously manipulate CEOs of 
large corporations to settle otherwise potentially frivolous lawsuits by 
threatening to include private information in shareholder’s complaints filed 
with the Court of Chancery. 
The reasoning invoked in Hurd has little basis in existing law. The 
court failed to cite even one case to support its decision that the Allred 
Letter did not contain confidential information. Although the case law does 
not offer great guidance as to what would constitute “confidential 
information,” the court could have looked to other Delaware cases that 
interpreted Rule 5(g) for principles to apply to the instant case. 
For example, in Stone, the court set out a balancing test to decide 
whether a document is sufficiently confidential to constitute good cause.
57
 
Some Delaware courts have explained that, under the First Amendment, 
court proceedings should be open to the public.
58
 The U.S. Supreme Court 
has interpreted this principle to include judicial records and documents.
59
 
In the same fashion, the instant court should have weighed the public’s 
interest in having access to court filings against the interest of individuals 
in protecting their private and confidential information. The instant case 
did not even attempt to balance these interests. 
Analyzing Romero demonstrates another example of how the instant 
case failed to utilize precedent to support its decision. Although Romero 
did not set out the clearest standards for what would constitute confidential 
information, the court did supply some explanation that the instant case 
could have applied. The Romero court explained that the information that 
was requested sealed was not confidential because the information 
included no identifying names or other identifying information.
60
 Had the 
instant case applied this reasoning, the court likely would have found that 
the information was confidential. The Allred Letter was replete with 
identifying information for both Hurd and Fisher. Thus, Hurd was 
incorrectly decided because the court failed to follow or reconcile binding, 
                                                                                                                     
 57. Stone v. Ritter, No. 1570-N, 2005 WL 2416365, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 26, 2005). 
 58. In re Nat’l City Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 4123-CC, 2009 WL 1653536, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
June 5, 2009) (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579 n.17 (1980)); see 
also Kronenberg v. Katz, 872 A.2d 568, 608 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“But, if trial courts permit the sealing 
of (all or part of the record of) a judicial proceeding simply because the parties wish to conceal their 
dispute or because the parties take an unreasonably broad view of what matters are truly 
confidential, they risk injuring the public’s right of access and generating appellate decisions that 
constrain trial courts not only from sealing judicial records when there is no justification for doing 
that, but that thereby make it more difficult for trial courts to protect truly sensitive information 
from public disclosure, when that protection is genuinely warranted.”). 
 59. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). 
 60. Romero v. Dowdell, No. Civ.A. 1398-N, 2006 WL 1229090, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 
2006). 
7
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relevant precedents to justify its ruling.
61
  
In addition to lacking legal basis, Hurd was also incorrectly decided 
due to the unpersuasive, illogical grounds the court offered in attempting to 
justify the Allred Letter being classified as nonconfidential. The court 
initially justified the nonconfidentiality of the letter by stating that it was 
sent to Hurd in his official capacity as CEO of HP. Although the Allred 
Letter was addressed to Hurd and sent to his office at HP, the letter was 
clearly marked as personal, confidential, and “for Mr. Hurd’s eyes only.” 
Even if the Allred Letter was sent to Hurd in his official capacity, it does 
not change the fact that the letter is confidential. Surely, the court is not 
suggesting that everything addressed to a corporation’s CEO is 
nonconfidential. What if the letter contained information about trade 
secrets or medical information? The mere fact that it was addressed to 
Hurd as CEO of HP does not automatically mean that the Allred Letter is 
nonconfidential. 
The court also attempted to justify its holding by stating that the letter 
noted that the claims were against both HP and Hurd. This one sentence in 
the opinion does little, if anything, to explain why this fact is significant. 
Regardless of the litigants to the claims, the information in the letter still 
contained third-party confidential information. Hurd does not surrender his 
privacy rights by virtue of being the CEO of a publicly traded company.
62
  
Next, the instant court tried to justify its holding by stating that most of 
the media knew about the substance of the letter, even though the letter 
was under seal. The fact that a document contains information that is 
already in the public sphere is a sufficient justification labeling the 
document nonconfidential;
63
 however, the court did not give any support 
for this proposition. Hurd offers no evidence that the media actually knew 
the substance of the letter before it was unsealed. Imagine a scenario in 
                                                                                                                     
 61. See Oscar George, Inc. v. Potts, 115 A.2d 479, 481 (Del. 1955). The Supreme Court of 
Delaware has elaborated on the point that our justice system relies on precedent: 
The rule of stare decisis means that when a point has been once settled by decision 
it forms a precedent which is not afterwards to be departed from or lightly 
overruled or set aside even though it may seem in later years archaic. This rule is 
grounded upon public policy and should be followed except for urgent reasons 
and upon clear manifestation of error. 
Id. 
 62. But see Tom C.W. Lin, Undressing the CEO: Disclosing Private, Material Matters of 
Public Company Executives, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 383, 394–95 (“Such heightened status from the 
investing public should also come with heightened accountability to the investing public, and 
sensible additional disclosure from public company executives would be a responsible step in that 
direction.”). 
 63. One Sky, Inc. v. Katz, No. Civ.A. 1030-N, 2005 WL 1300767, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 12, 
2005) (“Any documents or information that do not fit the above criteria, cannot harm the parties or 
third parties, or previously have entered the public sphere should be deemed available for public 
disclosure.”). 
8
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which the plaintiff was responsible for “leaking” the substance of the 
Allred Letter.
64
 Would it be fair to grant the plaintiff’s motion to unseal the 
letter for nonconfidentiality even though he was the one who disseminated 
it to the media? This logic leads to perverse incentives. If a plaintiff wanted 
to unseal portions of the pleadings, he need only send the information to 
the media and then argue to the court that the letter should be unsealed 
because it is already available to the public. 
Additionally, the court in Hurd attempted to justify the 
nonconfidentiality of the Allred Letter by stating that it “does not describe 
any intimate conversations or conduct.”65 It is unclear how the court did 
not find that the Allred Letter contained “intimate” conversations or 
conduct. Even if the court applied a very narrow interpretation of the word 
“intimate,” the letter included more than enough examples. For instance, 
one passage of the letter describes when Hurd’s hand brushed across  
Fisher’s breast twice.66 The letter also discusses Hurd’s romantic partners 
in different cities around the country.
67
 In another example, the Allred 
letter discusses how Hurd tried to cajole Fisher into having sex with him. 
68
 
These examples are clearly of an intimate nature, and that sensitive nature, 
among other reasons, should make the letter confidential.
69
  
A final reason that the instant case was decided incorrectly is because 
the Supreme Court of Delaware’s interpretation of Rule 5(g) creates 
dangerous policy implications that allow some shareholders and plaintiff 
attorneys to maliciously manipulate CEOs of large corporations into 
settling potentially frivolous lawsuits by threatening to include private 
information in shareholder’s complaints.  
The story of the late Steve Jobs, Apple’s former CEO, provides an 
illustration of the potential ramifications of the Hurd decision. In 2004, 
Jobs disclosed that he underwent successful surgery to remove a tumor in 
                                                                                                                     
 64. No evidence exists to suggest that Espinoza leaked information to the media. This is 
purely a hypothetical. However, one could readily imagine a malicious plaintiff or plaintiff’s 
attorney doing so. 
 65. Hurd v. Espinoza, 34 A.3d 1084, 1086 (Del. 2011). 
 66. Allred Letter, supra note 2, at 3. 
 67. Id. at 5. 
 68. Id. at 3. 
 69. Another reason supporting why the letter should have been kept confidential is that its 
facts turned out to be not fully accurate: 
Fisher sent a letter to Hurd related to certain aspects of the Allred Letter (the 
“August 5 Letter”). In it she states: “First, I do not believe that HP engaged in any 
inappropriate conduct towards me in any way. Second, there are many 
inaccuracies in the details of the [Allred Letter]. I do not believe that [Hurd’s] 
behavior was detrimental to HP or in any way injured [HP] or its reputation.” 
Espinoza v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 6000-VCP, 2011 WL 941464, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 2011) 
(alterations in original). Further, it is likely that Hurd’s reputation was irreparably damaged as a 
result of the allegations—even if they were false.  
9
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his pancreas.
70
 In 2008, while presenting a new Apple product in San 
Francisco, California, Jobs looked very sick.
71
 Investors were suspicious 
that his pancreatic cancer had returned, but Apple blamed the illness on a 
“common bug.”72 People quickly began discussing Apple’s succession 
plan, without having proof that Jobs’ cancer had returned.73 
Imagine the following hypothetical (and assume for the purposes of this 
hypothetical that no laws, including the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), were implicated or violated): Following the 
product demonstration, Apple (with Jobs’ consent) obtains Jobs’ medical 
records to adequately prepare a succession plan in the event that Jobs could 
no longer work. Members of Apple’s board of directors and Jobs exchange 
several e-mails discussing Jobs’ illness and options for the succession plan. 
A suspicious shareholder, pursuant to section 220, requests to inspect and 
to make copies of relevant Apple documents, including Jobs’ medical 
records and the e-mail exchanges. That shareholder then brings suit against 
Apple for failing to create a succession plan earlier and includes Jobs’ 
medical records and the e-mails in the complaint. Under the rule set forth 
in Hurd, the court arguably would not hold Jobs’ medical information––in 
the medical records or the e-mails––“confidential” for the purposes of 
Rule 5(g) because it failed to satisfy the “good cause” requirement to keep 
documents under seal.
74
 Jobs’ medical information likely would be subject 
to public disclosure due to sinister maneuvers by plaintiff’s counsel. Under 
Hurd, that information likely would have been disclosed because (1) it 
would be relevant to a suit against both Apple and Jobs, (2) the public 
could see that Jobs was sick, thus, the information was in the public 
domain, and (3) no “intimate” conversations or conduct is described in the 
medical information.  
Of course, Steve Jobs likely would not have wanted to disclose his 
personal medical information included in the records and e-mails––even 
disregarding the harm it may have caused Apple––because fighting a 
disease such as pancreatic cancer is a private and personal ordeal. It is 
probable that another CEO in this position would try to settle the case with 
the plaintiff, even if the claims were false, to avoid disclosing the CEO’s 
                                                                                                                     
 70. Apple CEO Jobs’s Health Reports Since Cancer Diagnosis in 2003: Timeline, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 25, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-25/apple-ceo-
jobs-s-health-reports-since-cancer-diagnosis-in-2003-timeline.html.  
 71. See Jobs’s Job, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 2008, at 68. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id.  
 74. See Tom C.W. Lin, Executive Trade Secrets, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (2012) 
(arguing that certain private information should be protected from disclosure as an “Executive 
Trade Secret”); see also Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts About Executive Officers: A 
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private information to the public. When removed from the context of a 
sexual harassment suit and placed in the context of an iconic CEO 
diagnosed with cancer, it is easier to see why the Supreme Court of 
Delaware decided Hurd incorrectly.  
Additionally, it is important to note that CEOs are particularly 
susceptible to attack under the Hurd ruling because, in terms of 
reputational harm, CEOs have much more to lose than the average person. 
Today, investors view a CEO as an extension of the corporation that he 
manages.
75
 Many investors look to a corporation’s CEO when deciding 
whether to invest in the corporation.
76
 The future of a corporation can 
depend on what the public knows about its CEO. A famous CEO will be 
more vulnerable to frivolous lawsuits where devious plaintiff’s attorneys 
include private information in the court filings. These policy repercussions 
are especially frightening coming from Delaware because of how 
influential the state is on issues of corporate litigation across the United 
States.
77
 Thus, Hurd was incorrect as it creates dangerous policy 
implications that will allow shareholders and plaintiff’s attorneys to 
maliciously manipulate CEOs of large corporations into lucrative 
settlements of potentially frivolous lawsuits by threatening to include 
private information in shareholder’s complaints. 
Although a court would not be able to seal personal information in 
every case,
78
 the court in Hurd should have kept the Allred Letter under 
seal. Hurd was decided incorrectly because it has little basis in existing 
law, the court offered no persuasive, logical reasons for unsealing the 
Allred Letter, and the court’s interpretation of Rule 5(g) has perverse and 
potentially far-reaching policy implications. The perilous ramifications of 
this case extend far beyond the Delaware courts, and the Hurd decision 
therefore should be immediately overturned.
79
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